China-India Brief #102

china-india-brief-100


Published Twice a Month
September 27 – October 10, 2017

Centre on Asia and Globalisation
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy


Guest Column

Donglang Standoff and China-India Relations

by Liu Zongyi

After two months of tension, the standoff at Donglang (Doklam) finally ended peacefully in late August 2017. Donglang revealed India’s strategic ambition and its dissatisfaction towards China’s regional policies. Most importantly, the outcome of the standoff may affect China’s strategic perceptions of India and the future direction of China-India bilateral relations.

During the BRICS Summit in Xiamen, President Xi Jinping said at the meeting with Prime Minister Narendra Modi that healthy and stable China-India relations would serve the interests of people in both countries. China, Xi said, “is willing to work with India on the basis of the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence to improve political mutual trust, promote mutually beneficial cooperation, and push bilateral ties along the right track”.

Responses from the Indian side showed that they might not yet be receptive to China’s overtures of peace. As soon as the BRICS Summit ended, Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat accused China of “salami slicing, taking over territory in a very gradual manner,” and noted that in the case of an India-China war, Pakistan would be ready to “[take] advantage of the situation [that would develop] along the northern border”. India, therefore, should make preparations to fight a two-front war with both powers simultaneously. These comments aside, India has also begun accelerating road construction near the Line of Actual Control along the Chinese-Indian border. This is ironic, since the Donglang standoff was sparked by India’s accusations of Chinese road building in the region. India also has plans to build a railway leading to the town of Leh, on the western part of the China-Indian border. When completed, the railway will have major strategic implications. Not only would it facilitate the movement of personnel and supplies to the border, but it also may reduce the travel time from Delhi by half.

Before the Donglang standoff, three factors influenced China’s foreign policy towards India: the first was India’s triple identity as a contiguous neighbour, a great power, and a developing country; the second was India’s importance to the emerging Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) – not only was it identified as one of the four key countries of the initiative, but also the entire South Asian and Indian Ocean regions were considered important strategic intersections of the BRI; and lastly, the fact that in spite of the immense economic importance of South Asia, the region was not viewed as a major strategic focus for China. These factors together led China to pursue economic engagement and cooperation with India rather than seeing it as a major adversary.

Donglang, however, has shown that a redefinition of India’s status in China’s foreign policy is necessary. In order to achieve this, it is important to understand how Indian strategic elites view China.

Firstly, they believe that conflict between China and India is a structural one. The Indians seem to think that while China outwardly claims to embrace a multi-polar world, it is in fact pursuing the establishment of a bi-polar world and a unipolar Asia. India feels that there should be at least three dominant powers in Asia – China, Japan, and itself. It wants to be seen as China’s equal and does not want to play second fiddle.

For India, the BRI and China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) are seen as Chinese measures to dominate Asia and establish its status as a global power. Chinese investment and infrastructure construction in South Asia, the Indian Ocean, and along its border are seen as aggressive attempts to surround India and press its strategic space. Given this, it is unsurprising that India’s reaction is to strike back resolutely and not allow China to gain any strategic advantage. India’s thinking was clearly reflected in its behaviour at Donglang.

India’s strategic priority is the Indo-Pacific Ocean. In the maritime south, the focus is to expand India’s presence and influence. In the northern frontier, the strategy is to ‘hold the line’ and maintain the status quo while accelerating the integration of the frontier regions and its people by speeding up and improving communication infrastructure with the Indian mainland.

To balance China, India has pursued militarisation of the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and has enhanced strategic cooperation with the US, Japan, Australia, and Vietnam. India’s goal is to hedge against the BRI through military and security cooperation and to impose restrictions on China’s economic cooperation with countries along the BRI in line with so-called international laws, norms, and standards. India’s balancing strategy is thus a combination of defence, political, and economic measures, with the emphasis lying on defence and military.  Another new facet of India’s strategy is the Asia-Africa Growth Corridor (AAGC), which India and Japan have been working on since last year.

Secondly, India’s ultimate aim appears to be to eventually match China. Hence, even though China currently dominates Asia’s value and production chains and is already India’s largest trading partner, the latter has instead chosen to pursue cooperation with other states like the US, Japan, and European countries. Its goal is to absorb their investments and technologies and take over China’s place in the global value and production chains. This does not mean that India has shied away from economic cooperation with China. In fact, Indian senior officials have publicly welcomed Chinese investments on many occasions. Just after the Donglang standoff, in a meeting with China’s Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan in Manila, Indian Commerce Minister Suresh Prabhu called for more Chinese investment in India and said there would be “facilitating measures, including in SEZs [special economic zones].” In fact, India wants to utilise China’s abundant resources. Moreover, India in 2016, revised the Enemy Property Act, 1968, which was aimed at China and Pakistan. Curtailing close economic relations between China and India could cause heavy damage to both.

There are currently many high-level dialogue mechanisms between China and India. However, as Donglang has shown, they were unable to prevent the deterioration of bilateral relations, which in turn, seriously impacted economic cooperation at the global and regional levels, such as the BRICS cooperation and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) negotiations. After Donglang, the Indian side expressed its hope of starting a new special high-level dialogue mechanism. It is doubtful if one more dialogue channel will help China-Indian relations break out of its vicious cycle. What perpetuates this cycle in the Chinese view is India’s style of diplomacy. Rather than a ‘give and take’ approach, India focuses on maximising its own benefits. China has tried and will continue to try its best to communicate with India’s current foreign policy makers and strategic elites, but it may be difficult to change their views on China.

 

Liu Zongyi is a senior fellow of Shanghai Institutes for International Studies and a visiting fellow of the Chongyang Institute for Financial Studies, Renmin University of China.

 


Guest Column

Indo-China Relations: Power Play or Power Dilemma?

by Rajiv Ranjan

India and China, two of the world’s oldest civilisations and simultaneous rising powers, are engaged in a geopolitical power-play. Competition between the two, however, is not inevitable and as past experience has shown, constructive engagement can bring great benefits to both sides. Both countries cooperated successfully, along with other members of the BRICS, to establish the New Development Bank. The India-China climate alliance was another example of bilateral cooperation for a mutually beneficial cause. Besides high-level engagements, people-to-people exchanges are also increasing with greater numbers of people from both sides visiting, working, and studying in the other’s country. Today, globalisation has brought the two neighbours closer together than at any other point in history. Yet, it has also made their relationship far more entangled and complex.

Both India and China are undergoing a process of power accumulation with the ultimate aim of re-establishing themselves as great powers within the international system. As contiguous neighbours, they will need each other’s help to fulfil their ambitions. However, their relationship continues to be marked by distrust. Many in India and China perceive their relationship as a zero-sum game, whereby strategic policies which serve the national interests of one are seen to be detrimental to the other.

We can analyse the power accumulation process in China and India by focusing on three aspects of power – political, economic, and military.

Political power largely comes from membership in powerful international organisations and groupings, such as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG), Group of 7 (G7), and voting rights in economic institutions including the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and strategic alliances. Permanent membership in the UNSC has also vested China with veto power. The Asian superpower has been economical in using this right, exercising it only 11 times since joining the UNSC in 1971. Yet, closer inspection of China’s behaviour reveals a more recent and disturbing trend – out of these 11 vetos, 10 were cast in the last twenty years between 1997 and 2017. This increasing willingness to exploit its political power to maximise its interests would undoubtedly make New Delhi more apprehensive of Beijing.

In 2016, India’s GDP was $2.264 trillion, a fraction of China’s, which stood at $11.199 trillion. Additionally, in 2016, China was rated as the world’s largest economy in terms of purchasing power parity (PPP) by both the IMF and World Bank. There is also a clear disparity in terms of defence spending as China allocated $151.43 billion in 2017 towards defence, compared to India’s allocation which was roughly one third of that at $53.5 billion. A comparison of their overall military strength shows that India would require substantial financial investment, technological upgrading, and administrative overhauling to catch up with China.

While China currently surpasses India in all three aspects of power, it is undeniable that the latter has made significant strides in these same areas. Over the last few years, India has strengthened its strategic partnership with other major powers, most significantly with the US, undergone continued and sustained economic growth, and made advancements in military technology, including nuclear strike capabilities. These developments, among others, are seen by both policy-makers and academics in Beijing as New Delhi’s growing clout in international politics and more importantly, as a balance to China. Similarly, most strategic analysts in New Delhi view China’s rise and its growing influence in South Asia, India’s backyard, as detrimental to its own rise. China’s ambitious Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has also been seen as an attempt to enlarge Beijing’s sphere of strategic influence and as a detriment to India’s sovereignty.                  

This relationship between New Delhi and Beijing represents a power dilemma – a situation in which each state seeks more power to respond to what it perceives as the growing power of a rival, which in turn causes the rival to try to increase its power, and so on in an action-reaction pattern. As a result, both might find themselves worse off. When one state is wary of another state gaining political power by acquiring membership in coveted international organisations or by making strategic partnerships with different states across the globe by virtue of its economic and military heft and enlarging its sphere of influence, it could well instigate the other to do the same, fueling the rivalry further. Opposition to India’s membership to the NSG and silence over India’s bid for permanent membership of the UNSC can be interpreted as Beijing’s strategy to deny India greater international power. The power play at Doklam reflected the deepening power dilemma between the two. If their worsening relations are not handled well, the hard-earned successes of previous governments could potentially be undone.

 Fortunately, despite the on-going strategic competition and power dilemma, both countries have been keen to avoid misadventures that may destabilise relations, which in turn, may hinder the process of power accumulation. In fact, both New Delhi and Beijing have continuously made efforts to mitigate the misunderstandings that keep occurring in their relations. For instance, India was a founding member of the China-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and more recently, was accepted as a full member of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation (SCO), something that was only possible with China’s acquiescence.

 What is clear is that both India and China need to reformulate their existing engagement policies and strengthen confidence-building measures in order to overcome the existing ‘power dilemma’. By showing greater assertiveness, China is simply giving India incentives to look for balancing partners. Instead, China should seek to earn India’s goodwill, for instance, by supporting the latter’s bid for the UNSC. New Delhi could similarly take a step towards repairing bilateral ties and helping to erase the unhappy memory of Doklam by choosing to participate in the BRI.

Although India has pursued a strategic partnership with the US, it must manage this relationship carefully. History has shown that allies tend to sacrifice their ambitions to be under shadow of the hegemon. Bandwagoning with China could potentially be more beneficial as the US-China engagements from 1972 onwards demonstrate, with Beijing very much the junior partner.  Needless to say, any attempts to balance each other constructs a loop that traps both India and China and their ambitions. But that in no way signals that both are destined to fall into the proverbial ‘Thucydides trap’ in Asia.

 

Rajiv Ranjan is currently an Assistant Professor at College of Liberal Arts, Centre for Global Studies, Shanghai University, Shanghai. He has previously worked as a Research Fellow at the Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), New Delhi and was a Senior Visiting Scholar at the School of Political Science and Public Administration, Shandong University, Jinan.

 

The views expressed in the article are solely those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the position or policy of the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy or the National University of Singapore.


 

News Reports

Bilateral relations

China urges India to ‘face the facts and abide by historic treaty’ on border areas
The Times of India, October 8
The Chinese foreign ministry on Sunday said “the Sikkim section of the China-India border has been demarcated by the historical boundary “. In a written response to PTI, it said, “It is the best testimony to this fact. We urge the Indian side to face the facts, abide by the provisions of the historic boundary treaty and the relevant agreement of the parties, and work together with the Chinese side to maintain peace and tranquility in the border areas.”

China puts more boots at Doklam 
The Hindu, October 4
A conclave of Army Commanders next week is set to discuss military preparedness along the China border, amid indications that the Chinese may have beefed up their presence near the Doklam standoff site since the disengagement more than a month ago. According to sources in the Indian security establishment, the Chinese have 1,500 to 1,700 troops of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) stationed a few hundred metres away from the standoff site on their side.

Post-Doklam, expert panel to study all border issues
The Economic Times, October 3
India has decided to constitute a high-level expert committee to study various issues relating to 3488km India-China border, including poor infrastructure and measures to integrate border population with the mainstream with development measures. The move comes over a month after the resolution of Doklam stand-off which saw Indian and Chinese troops in an eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation for nearly ten weeks over Beijing’s attempt to construct a road in the disputed area.

Post-Doklam, no invite from China for its National Day border meet
The Indian Express, October 2
Departing from past practice, the Chinese army did not send an invitation to its Indian counterpart for a ceremonial border personnel meeting (BPM) to mark China’s National Day on Sunday. This follows a no-show by the Chinese in response to an Indian invitation to attend a ceremonial BPM on Indian Independence Day on August 15. This is the first time since 2005 that there was no BPM held on the India-China border.

‘Dragon and Elephant’ should dance together: Chinese embassy spokesperson on Indo-China relations
The New Indian Express, October 2
A spokesperson of the Embassy of China in New Delhi has said that the dragon (China) and elephant (India) should dance together to make most from bilateral relations. “The dragon and elephant should dance together to achieve the political effects of making one plus one eleven in Sino-India relations. I am full of confidence and expectations for the future of China-India relations. Interestingly, the Chinese have echoed the vision of Mr Modi on “making one plus one eleven’ in Sino-Indian ties,” Spokesperson and Press Counsellor of Chinese Embassy in New Delhi Xie Liyan said in a video released by the embassy on the 68th anniversary of the founding of the People’s Republic of China last week.

 

News Reports

China and India in the Regions

Foreign secretary in Delhi: Bangladesh supports China’s One-Belt-One Road
Dhaka Tribune, October 7
Bangladesh has backed China’s $4 trillion One-Belt-One Road initiative, also known as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), after Bangladesh’s Foreign Secretary Shahidul Haque explained the need to balance “sovereignty” and “economic integration” during his visit to the World Economic Forum (WEF) in New Delhi on Thursday, reports India Today. This comes a day after the Trump administration weighed in on India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).

India’s foreign secretary discusses bilateral issues with Bhutan’s top leaders
Livemint, October 5
Indian foreign secretary S. Jaishankar held talks with the top leadership of Bhutan this week—the first such interaction between the two countries since India and China ended a tense 73-day military standoff on Bhutan’s Dokalam plateau in August. Bhutan has special ties with India and is closer to New Delhi than Beijing. Bhutan does not have diplomatic ties with China, something Beijing has been trying to rectify in the past few years. Bhutan also is in talks with China to settle their boundary, some sections of which are yet to be demarcated.

On OBOR, US backs India, says it crosses ‘disputed’ territory
The Times of India, October 4
The Trump administration on Tuesday threw its weight behind India’s opposition to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), saying it passes through a disputed territory and no country should put itself into a position of dictating the Belt and Road initiative.

 

News Reports

Trade and Economy

India vs China: GDP growth perspectives and steel industry’s stake
Financial Express, October 4
The Asian Development Outlook 2017 Update, published recently by ADB, has estimated GDP growth for India at 7% in 2017 (0.4% lower than April projection) and at 7.4% in 2018 (0.2% lower). Barring Bangladesh, Myanmar and Cambodia, the projected GDP growth of India is still the highest in developing Asia, which includes Japan, South Korea and China. The estimates for India exceed that of China by 0.3% in the current year and by 1% in 2018. There are a few observations in the report on the different economic management process of the two countries that have an important bearing on the development of steel industry.

India gives blessing to Oppo stores as focus turns to Apple
Reuters, October 4
India has given Chinese smartphone maker Oppo the go-ahead to open its own single-brand retail stores, boding well for rivals like Apple Inc which are seeking similar approvals. Oppo has become the first pure play smartphone brand to win such a clearance in the world’s No. 3 smartphone market, where Apple has been vying for a bigger market share. Although India allows foreign firms to sell directly to consumers through a ‘single-brand retail’ route, companies must source 30 percent of the products locally. The country moved to partially relax those conditions in 2016, exempting foreign retailers from the sourcing rule for three years in a bid to attract more investment.

China quickly becoming No.1 tourist destination for Indians
Global Times, October 3
China is becoming one of the most popular destinations for Indian tourists and both sides are working together to boost tourism cooperation, according to a report by Xinhua News Agency on Monday [October 2]. Recent years have witnessed India’s outbound tourism soar, with more and more Indians choosing China as their top destination. It’s estimated that the number of outbound tourists from India will reach 50 million overall by 2020, up from 21.87 million in 2016, said the report.

 

News Reports

Energy and Environment

Govt sets up committee for water management in north-east
Livemint, October 5
The Indian government has set up a high-level committee to evolve a strategy for management of the region’s water resources. “The committee will facilitate optimising benefits of appropriate water management in the form of hydro-electric power, agriculture, bio-diversity conservation, reduced flood damage erosion, inland water transport, forestry, fishery and eco-tourism,” the government said in a statement on Wednesday. As part of the strategy that is also being viewed as an attempt to contain China, an India-Japan Coordination Forum for Development of North East has been set up to focus on strategic projects such as connectivity and road network development, electricity and disaster management.

India’s renewables to double by 2022, overtake EU expansion: IEA
Livemint, October 5
India’s renewable energy capacity will more than double by 2022, which would be enough to overtake renewable expansion in the European Union for the first time, International Energy Agency (IEA) said in a report. The country’s renewable energy installed capacity is 58.30 GW as per the recent government data. The government has an ambitious target of raising it to 175 GW by 2022 including 100 GW of solar and 60 GW of wind energy. “By 2022, India’s renewable capacity will more than double. This growth is enough to overtake renewable expansion in the European Union for the first time,” IEA said

India to surpass China as fastest growing oil market in 2018: Moody’s
Livemint, October 3
On the back of a 6% demand growth, India will surpass China as the fastest growing Asian market for petroleum products in 2018, says a report. This is possible as Chinese demand growth is seen halving to 2.5-3% in 2017-18 from a higher 6% in 2016-17. Despite the weakening growth numbers in both these countries, China and India will continue to be the key growth engines for the sector in Asia, representing over 80% of the expected growth in 2018, says a report by Moody’s.

India, China vie to tap clean energy market by phasing out fossil-fuel vehicles
Hindustan Times, October 3
Asian rivals India and China are bracing for a new war that promises to be a breath of fresh air and change the way we commute. The two countries want to transform mobility from fossil fuels to electric to tackle air pollution and control international trade in clean energy, a sector that is expanding at a fast clip. China announced recently that they were considering a ban on petrol and diesel-guzzling cars to phase out fossil-fuel vehicles. India matched the announcement last week declaring the cabinet would soon stop the registration of fossil-fuel vehicles by 2030. 

 


Analyses

India must overcome security paranoia
Global Times, October 8
Doklam is Chinese territory and under effective control and supervision of the Chinese government. During the Doklam face-off, Beijing intensified efforts to develop infrastructure in the region and road construction there will be a long-term trend. Some Indian nationalists over-estimate India’s strength and rights, assuming New Delhi can bark orders across the border at Beijing.  India’s concerns about the Siliguri Corridor’s security are understandable, but New Delhi cannot mess around. China is also concerned about the transport route security across the Indian Ocean and the Strait of Malacca, but Beijing has taken no coercive measures to achieve its aims.

Is Mauritius big enough for China and India?
Financial Times, October 5
Border flare-ups in the Himalayas between India and China have long been a feature of international politics, yet, curiously, the two countries now find themselves rubbing shoulders in the less hostile terrain of distant Mauritius. Mauritian ambitions as a financial centre involve both India and China playing big parts in its future. As it reinvents itself as an active launch pad for investors in Africa — from being, in the past, primarily a place to store offshore wealth — Mauritius wants to deepen its existing ties to India while cultivating new ones with China.

Why Does India’s ‘Act East’ Policy Not Extend to China?
The Wire, October 3
The wide linguistic gulf between India and China is one factor that aggravates the general sense of incomprehension that the people of the two countries already have about the other. For the last ten centuries, India and China have been neighbours – yet strangers – to each other, though the thousand years before that saw a vibrant cultural interflow between them. However, travellers of that era overcame the formidable obstacle of language, to achieve a high level of understanding of the life and culture of the other nation. But today’s science offers us a counter-intuitive insight – that the wide linguistic difference between the two nations can be an opportunity to create a partnership of creativity and innovation between them.

India and China new players in Central Asia’s ‘Great Game’
The Economic Times, October 2
A great game is unfolding in resources-rich, but landlocked, Central Asia, where China through its one-belt-one-road (OBOR) initiative is attempting to harness maximum mineral and hydrocarbon wealth as well as grow the market for its goods. India, not to be left behind, has also embarked on a Connect Central Asia policy, trying to overcome a disadvantage it has: lack of direct connectivity to the region.

China’s Djibouti military base: ‘logistics facility’, or platform for geopolitical ambitions overseas?
South China Morning Post, October 1
Beijing has described its military outpost at Djibouti as a logistics facility for resupplying Chinese vessels on peacekeeping and humanitarian missions. But satellite imagery and unofficial reports show the base has military infrastructure, including barracks and storage and maintenance units, and docking facilities that can handle most vessels in its naval fleet. Situated en route to the strategically important Suez Canal, at the mouth of the Red Sea – the opening of the base has stoked concerns it would be a platform for Beijing’s geopolitical ambitions overseas.

China Fears India May Be Edging It Out in Culture Battle
The New York Times, September 30
China and India are engaged in a wary competition for regional influence and leadership. For much of the summer, the two nations were locked in a border standoff over a remote mountain pass in the Himalayas. But more and more, the two Asian giants are also competing to project soft power — or cultural influence — outside their borders. China’s development has been very comprehensive in terms of politics, economics and military. But in terms of soft power, India has done better than China.

US should not determine India’s status in Asia
Global Times, September 28
Washington is attempting to tie New Delhi to its chariot, but US intentions cannot bring about India’s rise or act as a viable bargaining chip for India in handling its relations with China. India will have to rely on itself rather than a few weapons the US sells to it, for its ambitions. The development of the US-India relationship is subtly connected to the development of the China-US and China-India relationship. But compared to New Delhi, Beijing is more determined and capable not to be manipulated when handling its relations with the two other countries. While Beijing has not considered India a factor in handling its ties with Washington, the Washington-New Delhi relationship has taken the need to contain China into account.

 


Books and Journals

BRICS or Bust?: Escaping the Middle-Income Trap
Stanford University Press, September 2017
Hartmut Elsenhans is a German political scientist and Emeritus Professor of International Relations at the University of Leipzig. His current research includes capitalism and social movements, structure of the international system, rise and demise of the capitalist world system, political economy of European integration and development politics and economics.

Salvatore Babones is the author or editor of ten books and more than two dozen academic research articles. His two main areas of academic research are the political economy of the greater China region and the methodology of quantitative modeling in the social sciences. He also publishes extensively on American social and foreign policy.

Once among the fastest developing economies, growth has slowed or stalled in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa. What policies can governments enact to jump-start the rise of these middle-income countries? Salvatore Babones and Hartmut Elsenhans argue that economic catch-up requires investment in the productivity of ordinary citizens. Diverging from the popular narrative of increased liberalization, this book argues specifically for direct government investment in human infrastructure; policies that increase wages and the bargaining power of labor; and the strategic use of exchange rates to encourage export-led growth. These measures raise up the majority and finance future productivity by driving broader consumption and fostering investment within national borders.

Though strategies like full employment, mass education, and progressive taxation are not especially controversial, none of the BRICS have truly embraced them. Examining barriers to implementation, Babones and Elsenhans find that the main obstacle to such reforms is an absence of political will, stemming from closely guarded elite privilege under the current laws. BRICS or Bust? is a short, incisive read that underscores the need for demand-driven growth, and why it has yet to be achieved.

Realising the Indo-Pacific: Tasks for India’s Regional Integration
Perth USAsia Centre, University of Western Australia, June 2017
L. Gordon Flake is the founding CEO of the Perth USAsia Centre. He was previously Executive Director of the Maureen and Mike Mansfield Foundation, a Senior Fellow and Associate Director of the Program on Conflict Resolution at The Atlantic Council of the United States and prior to that Director for Research and Academic Affairs at the Korea Economic Institute of America.

Realising The Indo-Pacific: Tasks for India’s Regional Integration brings together emerging scholars from Australia and India to explore India’s regional integration into the Indo-Pacific. Contributing authors include Stephen Smith, Natalie Sambhi, Jeffrey Wilson, Dhruva Jaishankar, Darshana Baruah, David Lang, Ananth Padmanabhan and Shashank Reddy. As the concept of the ‘Indo-Pacific’ region has increasingly gained momentum, there remains many opportunities and challenges for India to regionally integrate and realise the concept of the Indo-Pacific.

 


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the Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy, National University of Singapore