Recent theoretical work by Prof. Lejano develops the idea that collective action problems (e.g., the classic prisoner's dilemma) can be overcome when people are shown not just individual payoffs but multi-dimensional vector payoffs. This leads to new institutional designs for governance and helps explain why innovative designs using information-based regulations or boundary organizations are often more effective. This is generalized in a discussion, both conceptual and empirical, of how network configurations differ from classic market or state-centered designs. The model also provides directions for integrative policy analysis. Case study work is underway: Ecowatch and Proper programs in Southeast Asia, CALFED in California, and CDM carbon trading in Baja, Mexico. This recent work advances research directions laid out in his recent book. Frameworks for Policy Analysis: Merging Text and Context.
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Raul Lejano Associate Professor, Department of Planning, Policy, and Design University of California, Irvine
- Wednesday, 11 March 2009
- 5.00 p.m. - 6.15 p.m.
Seminar Room 3-1
Level 3, Manasseh Meyer
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
469C Bukit Timah Road