Increasing violence against physicians has been observed in many hospitals in China, attributed largely to medical malpractice disputes. Mechanisms for resolving malpractice dispute such as mediation, administrative regulation or tort litigation are not very effective in reducing violence in Chinese hospitals. Institutional peculiarity for malpractice dispute as well as hospital governance structure is pivotal to explaining this phenomenon. In this paper, a game theoretical model is employed to understand the relationship between medical malpractice, hospital governance and violence, given the government's incentive structure. One interesting conclusion of this paper is that the current health reform in China may have led to some unintended consequences for malpractice dispute.
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Dr Qian Jiwei, Research Associate, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore
- Wednesday, 11 January 2012
- 12.15 p.m. - 1.30 p.m.
Seminar Room 2-2
Level 2, Manasseh Meyer
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
469C Bukit Timah Road