This paper investigates the effects of revolving door regulations, laws that restrict the post-government employment opportunities of public sector workers-on the characteristics and behavior of U.S. state-level public utility commissioners. We find that commissioners from states with revolving door regulations have less expertise, serve shorter terms, and are less likely to be subsequently employed by the private sector, compared with their counterparts from states without revolving door laws. However, taking advantage of a quasi-experiment afforded by the fact that revolving door laws were introduced in different states at different times, we also find that revolving door regulations reduce electricity prices. We interpret these results as showing that while post employment restrictions may adversely affect the selection of individuals into public employment, they also reduce the potential for industry capture.
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Marc T. Law, Associate Professor, Department of Economics, University of Vermont
- Friday, 12 February 2010
- 12.15 p.m. - 1.30 p.m.
Seminar Room 3-5
Level 3, Manasseh Meyer
Lee Kuan Yew School of Public Policy
469C Bukit Timah Road